

Department of State

AIRGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL A-131

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO : DACCA, LAHORE, KARACHI, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, KABUL, MADRAS, NEW
DELHI
FROM : AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD Date : August 2, 1971
SUBJECT : Pakistan Internal Situation
REF : Islamabad 7598

Enclosures 1-3 are the full texts of the telegraphic contributions of Congens Dacca, Lahore and Karachi to the reference Embtel.

SOBER

Enclosures: 1. Dacca contribution drafted by A. Weisburd and R. Carle
2. Lahore contribution drafted by J. Hataway
3. Karachi contribution drafted by M. Van Order and D. Raynolds (para 5)

Unclassified on removal of enclosures

DACCA INTERNAL ASSESSMENT

1. **SUMMARY.** Security situation has not improved. Some evidence non-cooperation. Persecution of Hindus declining in direct proportion to decline in size Hindu population. No new information re Muslim League prospects, Bengali-Bihari relations, EPCAF, or leftist activities.

2. **MILITARY/SECURITY.** From MLA viewpoint, military/security situation has deteriorated somewhat since June 28. Madhupur Forest and Noakhali District have emerged as centers Mukti Bahini activity with guerrillas basing selves these regions. (General Farman Ali believes Toaha-Huq extreme leftist group responsible for Noakhali disturbances and claims army battalion has been deployed to cope with problem.) MB units may also be operating permanently in Comilla and Sylhet Districts. Congen received a few reports of army units being ambushed these four sectors. These constitute first example since immediate post-March 25 period of Bengalis taking on army from border regions. MB also attacking police stations these

areas. Exchange of fire continues in border regions. Most recent example mortaring of Comilla town July 20. Destruction of bridges and assassinations of peace committee members still widespread throughout eastern half of province. Rail link Dacca-Chittagong still closed. Mining of roads continues. Week July 11-17 truck filled with tea garden laborers struck anti-tank mine in Sylhet District. Approximately six killed, twelve wounded. Weekend July 16-18, food truck struck mine on Dacca-Comilla road between Daudkandi-Elliottganj. Three killed. Resistance has begun sniping at military vehicles along Comilla-Chittagong road in Feni area. Nightly bombings continuing in Dacca. Chittagong experienced three-four bombing incidents over past month. Resistance had two noteworthy accomplishments during month. First was fulfillment of threat to disrupt July 15 SSC (matriculation) examinations. Despite extensive army precautions four exam centers in Dacca and two in Mymensingh were bombed. Second was group of attacks on power transformer stations July 19. Operation not only fulfillment of threat but also most sophisticated undertaking in Dacca thus far in terms planning and organization. Little current information re western half of province. Our impression this area less active than east with only occasional interdiction and assassination and little direct anti-army activity. Some exchange of firing occurring along eastern border. With units now apparently operating permanently in province, increasing sophistication resistance activities in Dacca, beginnings of terror campaign in Chittagong and propaganda victories scored by disruption SSC Exam, we feel insurgency has made some progress in past month.

3. NON-COOPERATION. Major known instance of non-cooperation was poor attendance at SSC Exam through intimidation by MB also a factor. Relative importance MB threats versus individual determination to boycott exam not measurable. Observations by Congen officers and foreign traders confirm that at some levels of jute board, go-slow campaign has taken hold. May also be some slowdown in certain branches GOEP but this not certain. Many bureaucrats working more slowly than usual. Some have slowed down after apparent recovery from post-crackdown shock. But no definite way determine motive for slowdown. Non-cooperation may be factor in some cases.

4. MUSLIM LEAGUE PROSPECTS. Too early form conclusions on prospects Muslim League in by-elections. At minimum must wait to know number of seats to be contested and identities of candidates.

5. BENGALI-BIHARI RELATIONS. Our impression is Bengali-Bihari relations very bad. This conclusion based on incidents and attitudes previously reported and absence evidence that situation has changed since reports.

6. PERSECUTION OF HINDUS. Most blatant forms persecution of Hindus appear to have ceased. No recent reports mass slaughters or unprovoked burning of villages. Important factor in decline in persecution is drastic decrease in number of Hindus available to persecute. Latest estimate puts six million East Pakistan Hindus in India.

Vast majority remainder either in hiding, living in areas not easily accessible to army, or working in tolerated occupations, e.g., as sweepers, barbers, fishermen. One example this phenomenon Comilla town. District is 20% Hindu and town percentage at least as high as district. But only Hindus left in town are those in unattractive occupations. Cyclone area one of few where still large numbers unhidden Hindus of other than excepted classes. Reports from priest working that area indicate Hindus being denied relief supplies and subjected to army harassment. Question evacuee property covered septel.

7. **DE-HINDUIZATION.** Main instance de-Hinduization was expulsion of Hindus. Hindu monuments being destroyed some areas. Such destruction observed in Dacca and Chittagong and Hindu sculpture now very easy to obtain. Some Dacca streets with Hindu and English names renamed with Muslim names.

8. **EPCAF.** Information status EPCAF unavailable. Congen learned that organization called Razakar Bahini (Volunteer Force) being formed. These units organized by local peace committee when directed to do so by army. Peace committees naturally pick QUOTE reliable END QUOTE individuals. Razakars trained and armed by military but not uniformed. Razakars generally responsible for protection particular villages and bridges, power lines and so on in vicinity of villages.

9. **LEFT.** Toaha group communists very active in Noakhali area. Ahmedul Kabir in jail. Otherwise no information on leftist activities.

LAHORE INTERNAL ASSESSMENT

1. **MLA SUPPORT.** Yahya still enjoys firm support of Punjab majority. In fact, part played in Kissinger's China visit, McNamara's letter on publication of Cargill Report, have improved his image as well as that of U.S. Other factors which contribute to MLA support such as Indian threat, image of Yahya as savior of country, still operative. Economic pinch caused by rising prices, higher taxes, not yet strong enough to erode support. Labor leaders unhappy their inability function normally but minor labor layoffs have not effected rank and file. Students chafing under MLA restrictions but confining activities to right-left sparring on campus.

2. **CONSERVATIVES ACTIVE.** On political scene, activities of conservative parties have lessened domination of political platform by PPP. Qaiyum Khan's tours of Punjab have presented image of uncompromising patriotism which may have increased his popularity here. Merger of Convention and Council Muslim Leagues also drew considerable interest. Daultana, after sitting on sidelines for some time, reentered political scene with series speeches to party workers and press releases this week. In patriotic speech July 21 strongly attacked India, insisted transfer of power must be simultaneous both wings and only possible after complete normalcy in East

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 602

ISLAMA 11278 02 OF 02 171008 Z

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO : OCT-01 RSR-01 EUR-14 IO-12 SR-02 ORM-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02
 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 AID-20 E-11
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R 121210Z NOV 71 ZEL

FM : AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO : SECSTATE WASHDC 1471

INFO : AMCONSUL BOMBAY

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

AMCONSUL DACCA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MADRAS

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 11278

CORRECTED COPY (CALCUTTA ADDED AS INFO ADDEE) X

SUBJ : ATTITUDES REGARDING ROLE OF MUJIBUR RAHMAN IN POLITICAL
 SETTLEMENT IN EAST PAKISTAN CONFLICT

REF : ISLAMABAD 10861

8. Based on very limited available information, appears junior officers in particular hold very strong views on Mujib—that as person responsible for April massacres of Biharis and of army personnel and their families, and for subsequent military casualties he merits treatment as traitor. Passage of time with additional casualties may further harden this attitude.

9. Regime faced with situation where public attitude in West towards Mujib may soften over time in wake of mounting economic and political difficulties, but with views among influential elements within military services stiffening as result Bengali inflicted losses.

10. It possible Yahya was testing public sentiment by his widely publicized remarks to Newsweek to effect that Mujib would be released if public opinion demanded his freedom. Media reaction has been almost universally critical with only pro-Moscow Lahore Daily Azad among press endorsing President's stand, press has, however, been relatively muted. Pro-PPP New Times, for example, editorially treated Mujib's fate as matter for law courts to decide although paper clearly indicated it though Mujib guilty of treason. Pak Times, which presumes to speak for government, drew from Yahya's comment the interpretation that he was not actually advocacy Mujib's release but merely emphasizing that Mujib's future was of legitimate concern only to Pak people and not to foreigners. Only other reactions of note were Bhutto's restrained comment doubting that popular opinion would demand Mujib release and joint statement calling for Mujib's immediate release by retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan and 43 Lahore citizens mostly of radical or pro-Moscow bent. Yahya's statement has evidently had dual effect of creating more uncertainty a about GOP's current position on Mujib and of inducing relatively restrained and unemotionl, although generally unenthusiastic, reaction to possibility that Mujib could be freed.

11. In sum, we conclude that regime at present is under constraint in possible dealings with Mujib in that Mujib would have to agree to accept unified Pakistan before regime could overtly renew discussions with him looking towards political solution. Only such overt talks would stand chance of having appreciable effect curtailing insurgent activities in East Pakistan. This constraint will probably carry over to civilian government scheduled to be installed around year-end.

12. As to Mujib's own position, Dacca reports that his

NOTE: DOCUMENT INCOMPLETE. PAGES MISSING FROM ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

From: Nawabzada A.M. Raza,
HQA., H.K., S.Pk.

IMMEDIATE

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
2315 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

February 7, 1972.

My Dear Secretary of State,

The President of Pakistan has asked me to convey the following message to President Richard M. Nixon:

BEGINS :

Your Excellency,

I am addressing you on a humanitarian matter of great urgency which is causing utmost distress to my Government and people. This concerns the safety and security of hundreds of thousands of non-Bengalis including women and children whose very existence in East Pakistan is threatened as a result of planned retaliation and reprisals by armed personnel.

Following the occupation of East Pakistan by the Indian forces in December 1971 a reign of terror was let loose against the non-Bengalis particularly the Biharis in Mirpur and Mohammadpur localities of Dacca involving several hundred thousand persons for many days. The beleaguered residents of these areas were denied essentials of life to the extent of even stopping milk for infants.

Soon after his return to Dacca Sheikh Mujibur Rahman gave the assurance that everyone in East Pakistan including the non-Bengalis would receive full protection and that their lives and properties would be safeguarded. We welcomed this statement.

However, it is a matter of great anguish that the armed personnel in East Pakistan are committing savage atrocities on the non-Bengali residents in Dacca and other places in East Pakistan particularly Chittagong and Jessore. Incidents of brutality including rocket and mortar attacks on the unarmed Biharis have been reported by neutral observers. The International Red Cross teams have been refused access to the affected localities which are without food, medicines and water. These unfortunate people are now living in a state of extreme terror, helplessness and starvation. They have issued desperate appeals to the international community for relief and succour.

Your Excellency in view of the over-riding humanitarian considerations and to avoid further bloodshed of innocent people I request your personal intervention with

the Indian Government whose forces are still in East Pakistan and with the elected leaders in East Pakistan for the safety and security of the non-Bengali community. As parties to the United Nations Charter and in accord with the Geneva Conventions definite responsibilities devolve on all the countries to move in and to take active cognisance of and to stop the atrocities and killings of innocent people. Your prompt and positive contribution towards this end would not only earn the gratitude of the Government and the people of Pakistan but would also serve the greater cause of humanity.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

ENDS.

I will be grateful if you could kindly transmit the above message to its high destination.

With my respects
and Sincerely,

A.M. Raza

The Honorable
William P. Rogers,
The Secretary of State,
The Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 531 POSS DUPE

ISLAMA 02653 02 OF 02 271153Z

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ACTION : NEA-06

INFO : OCT-01 SS-14 EUR-IO 10-03 NSC-10 NSCE-00 L-02 INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
PM-03 DODE-00 SA-01 OMB-01 PRS-01 UPW-01 RSR-01 RSC-01 /060W
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R 270945Z MAR 72

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3649

INFO AMCONSUL DACCA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USMISSION USUN

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 2653

LIMDIS

SUBJECT : BHUTTO'S QUEST FOR PEACE -- PROBLEMS IN INITIATING TALKS WITH
INDIA AND MUJIB

REF: ISLAMABAD 2647 (NOTAL); ISLAMABAD 2648 (NOTAL)

5. Reverting to problem of POWs which seemed to be weighing heaviest on his mind, Bhutto said he had learned in Moscow of letter sent by PriMin Gandhi to Kosygin, in which she had said she could not let four divisions return to Pakistan without some prior progress toward peace settlement. Mrs. Gandhi did not seem to understand that some positive prior move by her on POWs would actually help Bhutto move toward settlement. Pakistan had plenty of manpower, he said, and it did not need the "Four Divisions" of personnel held in India for military ends.

6. Bhutto reiterated his readiness to meet Sheikh Mujib at any time. He wanted to make a start in restoring more normal relations. He was waiting for Mujib to open the door. I said I understood that in his talks with Sir Alec, Bhutto had expressed a new willingness to receive Biharis on a one-for-one basis as the Bengalis left Pakistan for Bangladesh. Bhutto acknowledged this was true. He did not foresee exchange happening in a sustained, massive way, but as the Biharis arrived he would try to see

that they were accommodated in places that would minimize problems, he still thought it would be better for the Biharis to remain, if they could, where they are but he was prepared to make a concession on this issue in the context of his effort to achieve an overall settlement of problems. For example, it could ease the problem of the return of POWs.

7. Comment: Bhutto's tone throughout this portion of conversation was conciliatory, highlighting the problems he sees for himself as the country's political leader in moving toward peaceful relationship in subcontinent in way that will best ensure popular support for his efforts. In his press conference immediately following our meeting (septel), he took harder line — presumably reflecting his reading of current attitudes in army and general public here — on Indian recalcitrance on POWs and Mujib's call for war crimes trials.

GP-3

SOBER

SECRET

PRESIDENT'S HOUSE
RAWALPINDI

15 April 1972

Dear Mr President,

I thank you for your letter of March 22, which was delivered to me by your Charge d'Affaires in Islamabad.

I am grateful to you for your concern for the well-being and security of the people of Pakistan and for the help you have offered my country in rebuilding our war-shattered economy. The assurance of your support at this critical juncture is most heartening.

I also thank you for your impressions of your historic visit to China, and for the outline of your talks and their significance. Your visit has not only paved the way to a healthier relationship with China but has considerably improved the prospect for world peace.

May I once again take this opportunity to discuss the situation in our sub-continent. I regret that I should have to deal with it at some length, but since you are shortly to visit Moscow I feel you may find this information of use in your discussions there.

On the 16th of March I went to Moscow principally to make a first-hand assessment of the intentions of the Soviet leadership towards the sub-continent I also wanted to assure the Soviet leaders of our desire to live in peace and to seek an honourable settlement of our problems with India.

My impression is that in the short term the Soviet Union probably wants to see an early return to peace and the "normalization" of the situation in the sub-continent. The Soviet leaders showed considerable anxiety that we recognise "Bangla Desh" and that I meet Mrs. Gandhi in order to negotiate a settlement of the problems that bedevil our relationship. But their desire for peace may be no more than a move in their efforts to consolidate their position in India and "Bangla Desh".

On the issue of prisoners of war, Mr. Kosygin read out from a letter of Mrs. Indira Gandhi her comment that she could not return our prisoners of war to augment Pakistan's war potential until she was satisfied as to Pakistan's peaceful intentions. I told both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev that I was resolve to work for peace between India and Pakistan and that if I intended otherwise there was no dearth of manpower available to join the armed forces in Pakistan.

I also gathered from the talks with Soviet leaders that the prisoners of war would not be returned until "Bangla Desh" had been recognised. I told them quite candidly that "Bangla Desh" had come into existence as a result of direct intervention by Indian armed forces and that it would be unrealistic to expect the people of Pakistan readily to accept the dismemberment of their country in this fashion. The question of

recognition arouses deep emotions among our people. It was therefore essential for me to lay the ground-work for such an eventuality. I expressed my willingness at this stage to signify an "intent to recognise" "Bangla Desh" and would like to meet Shaikh Mujibur Rahman to discuss with him this and other matters of mutual concern.

I told the Soviet leaders that they could greatly assist in preparing the climate for normalization of conditions and return to peace in the sub-continent by persuading India to release the prisoners of war immediately. I informed that it was wholly inappropriate for India to link the question of the release of prisoners of war with other political issues. They could not be used as hostages in brazen contravention of international conventions to which India was signatory.

The Indians are threatening the preservation of the tenuous peace that has been achieved; they have in the last month moved five additional Divisions to the West Pakistan border, and the Indian Chief of Staff has recently visited Moscow to replenish military equipment. Than too the Soviet Union and India have stepped up their subversive activities in both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

We have nevertheless responded positively to Mrs. Gandhi's proposal that the emissaries of both countries should meet to prepare the way for a meeting between the two of us. I have left her to decide the time and place for the emissaries to meet.

At the moment it appears that the prospects of any worthwhile negotiations with Shaikh Mujibur Rahman have diminished. The persecuting and killing of the helpless Biharis continues – for no other reason than that they are federalists. Many thousands of Bengalis who are opposed to the secession of East Pakistan have been dubbed "collaborators", consigned to concentration camps.

Moreover, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman seems determined with the cooperation and collaboration of India, to try some 1500 prisoners of war for alleged "war crimes". This is a most disturbing development. If the "Bangla Desh" authorities went forward with these trials they would indeed have very serious repercussions in Pakistan. There are over 400,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan. We have so far succeeded in ensuring that they are not maltreated in any way. But if the projected trials took place, they would generate such bitterness and resentment among our people that irreparable damage might be done to the prospects of establishing normal relations with India and "Bangla Desh".

Mr. President, the United States may be in a position to use its influence to prevent the Indian and 'Bangla Desh' authorities from going forward with the proposed trials. I shall be grateful for any assistance you can give us in this respect and for the influence you can use to promote to rapprochement between all the parties concerned so that a durable peace can be established in the sub-continent.

With warm personal regards,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

His Excellency
Mr Richard Nixon